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INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC or Court) is currently
conducting a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine, involving
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allegations against Israeli authorities and military personnel as well as what the
Prosecutor refers to as “Palestinian armed groups.”1 The preliminary
examination—opened in 2015 and currently placed in the so-called phase
three, where ICC prosecutors focus on examining whether the admissibility
requirements are satisfied2—creates a framework for advancing accountability
norms in the Palestinian context and globally for international crimes
committed by states with significant (military and diplomatic) resources.
However, the road to accountability is anything but straightforward. Indeed,
several challenges relating both to the applicable legal framework and broader
policy issues could delay—or potentially even undermine—the accountability
process, if not properly understood and managed. One particularly important
issue addressed in this Article relates to the ICC’s complementarity regime,
whereby the Court can only proceed with cases that are not subject to an active
and genuine investigation or prosecution domestically.3 Whereas this principle
is usually seen as something that intrinsically advances accountability norms,
this Article questions whether this is necessarily the case in situations
involving states with significant resources, including Israel in the Palestine
examination.
Contextualizing the Court’s activity in Palestine to other ICC interventions
that target states with significant resources, at the broadest level this Article
contributes to understanding the opportunities and challenges associated with
seeking accountability for violations committed by global or regional powers.4
It does so by taking the starting point in the ICC’s preliminary examination in
Palestine, and interrogates this process in light of the broader legal and policy
issues that arise in situations where the Court’s interventions clash with the
interests of such powers. In this sense, the Article aims to shed light on the
nature and prospects of an on-going legal process with significant policy
ramifications inside and outside of the region, including for the United States

1
Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities 2017, ¶¶ 51-78 (Dec. 4, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities].
2
Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities 2018, ¶¶ 251–294 (Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities]; Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary
Examinations ¶ 82 (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations].
3
Other important issues relating to the ICC’s jurisdiction and issues of admissibility, including the
ambiguous “gravity” standard, are not addressed in detail in this Article.
4
Although there is no consensus around the concept of global and regional powers—and what
States qualify as such—of the countries currently subject to ICC investigation or preliminary
examination, the United States (U.S.) is commonly considered a global power, whereas Russia, the
United Kingdom (U.K.) and—albeit more disputed—Israel are commonly considered regional powers.
While some would consider Nigeria a regional power, for the purposes of this Article it makes more
sense to not consider Nigeria as such, given its lack of the military and diplomatic capacity (or support)
that characterizes the other countries and, arguably, provide them with unique opportunities in terms of
influencing—and potentially countering—international legal processes. Of course, Israel’s ability to
exercise such influence is based not only on its own resources, but also, to a considerable extent, on its
ability to count on U.S. support. For a discussion of the concept of regional powers, see e.g., Detlef
Nolte, How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics, 36 REV. INT’L
STUD. 881 (2010). This Article uses the terms global and regional powers and countries with significant
(military and diplomatic) resources interchangeably.
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(U.S.).5 Beyond contributing to the understanding of key issues at play in the
Palestine examination,6 this is important because much remains to be
understood concerning the nature and impact of ICC preliminary
examinations,7 how the ICC’s complementarity regime functions in highly
sensitive political situations, and more broadly the opportunities and
challenges associated with pursuing accountability for crimes committed by
states with significant resources.8
The Article makes three overarching arguments that advance our
understanding of international criminal justice, in particular accountability for
violations by states with significant resources. First, whereas ICC prosecutors
are increasingly scrutinizing the actions of states with significant resources and
seem willing to proceed with investigating highly sensitive situations, there are
substantial challenges associated with achieving accountability for crimes
committed by such states. In part, this is because these states have unique
capabilities to create obstacles to accountability and, in part, because the ICC
legal and policy framework is not fully geared to handle such situations.
Second, even if there are important variations in government responses, states

5
Concerning policy ramifications in the U.S., see generally David Bosco, Palestine in The Hague:
Justice, Geopolitics, and the International Criminal Court, 22 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 155, 168 (2016)
(noting that the opening an investigation “would set in motion intense political maneuvering by all
concerned states. The impact would likely be most dramatic in the United States, where Congress might
consider new legislation limiting US [sic] support for and contact with the court.”). For a (pro-Israel)
discussion of policy ramifications for the U.S., see “The Palestinian Authority’s International Criminal
Court Gambit: A True Partner for Peace?”, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs
Subcomm. on the Middle East & N. Afr. Hearing, 114th Cong. 26-42 (2015) (written testimony of
Eugene Kontorovich).
6
A range of existing studies examine the ICC’s Palestine examination. Many of them do so from
the perspective of the broader policy ramifications of opening—or failing to open—an investigation or
the particular legal standards relating to jurisdiction. In contrast, there has been only limited
engagement with issues of complementarity in the context of the Palestine examination. For studies
addressing the Palestine examination, see generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Ad Hoc Declarations of
Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed. 2015); Bosco, supra note 5; Daniel Benoliel
& Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 73 (2010); John Dugard, Palestine
and the International Criminal Court: Institutional Failure or Bias?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 563
(2013); Eugene Kontorovich, When Gravity Fails: Israeli Settlements and Admissibility at the ICC, 47
ISR. L. REV. 379 (2014); Eugene Kontorovich, Israel/Palestine—The ICC’s Uncharted Territory, 11 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 979 (2013); Adam Oler, The Looming Demise of the ICC’s Complementarity
Principle: Israel, U.S. Interests, and the Court’s Future, 31 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 1001 (2017); Yaël
Ronen, Israel, Palestine and the IC—Territory Uncharted but not Unknown, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 7
(2014).
7
As Mark Kersten notes, “the preliminary examination stage presents a unique, if under-theorized,
opportunity to potentially affect the behaviour [sic] of conflict and post-conflict actors.” See Mark
Kersten, Casting a Larger Shadow: Premeditated Madness, the International Criminal Court, and
Preliminary Examinations, in QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: VOLUME II 655, 667
(Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018). Recently, however, international criminal law scholars
have paid more attention to preliminary examinations. See generally QUALITY CONTROL IN
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: VOLUME I & II. (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018).
8
However, some recent studies provide for case specific analysis of these issues. See, e.g., Carla
Ferstman, The International Criminal Court Prosecutor's Preliminary Examination on Afghanistan and
Possible Impacts on Accountability for Secret Detention and Rendition in EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY (Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo & Mark
Gibney eds., 2018); Thomas Obel Hansen, Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq? Examining
the Nexus between International and National Justice Responses, in QUALITY CONTROL IN
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: VOLUME I 399 (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018)
[hereinafter Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq].
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with significant resources tend to take ICC intervention seriously, and there is
some evidence that ICC interventions impact their behavior—although such
change in behavior is not necessarily to the benefit of accountability. In part,
this is because the launch of an internationally-driven accountability process
adds a level of pressure on states by virtue of creating increased scrutiny and
awareness of violations, and because ICC interventions—including
preliminary examinations—carry with them stigma and entail substantial
legitimacy costs for states, especially for those that claim to generally
subscribe to the international rule of law. This in turn creates opportunities for
actors seeking to promote accountability norms, though such opportunities are
often constrained by counter-action by the relevant state. Third—and related to
both of the above arguments—despite being typically viewed as something
inherently “good” in terms of advancing accountability norms, the ICC’s
complementarity regime often presents challenges for advancing accountability
in situations involving states with significant resources. This is partly because
these states have unique capabilities to utilize the complementary regime in
ways that are detrimental to accountability, including by framing and directing
domestic legal processes so as to prolong or otherwise frustrate the pursuit of
accountability for those who bear the greatest responsibility for international
crimes.
The Article proceeds by describing the background to the ICC’s
examination in Palestine, including its legal basis, the measures taken by
Palestine to trigger the Court’s intervention, and the current status of the
examination. Next, the Article explains what crimes are under ICC scrutiny
and discusses the consequences of this. While much remains unknown for
now, one key question to consider in that regard is what actors are likely to be
investigated—and potentially prosecuted—should a formal investigation be
opened. The Article then proceeds to an analysis of the ICC’s complementarity
regime, including an assessment of the legal and policy framework and
challenges and opportunities associated with giving effect to its values in the
Palestine case, and more broadly situations involving allegations against
resourceful states. The Article concludes by considering broader policy issues
associated with pursuing accountability for crimes by states with significant
resources.
I. BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF THE ICC’S PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF
THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PALESTINE EXAMINATION
On January 16, 2015, ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced
that the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter Office) had opened a preliminary
examination of the situation in Palestine.9 This followed a dual-action

9
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine (Jan.
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approach of the government of Palestine. On January 1, 2015, Palestine lodged
a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the retroactive
jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (OPT), including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.10 The day
after, the government made its deposition of instruments of accession to the
Rome Statute with the United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General. The Rome
Statute entered into force for Palestine on April 1, 2015, but due to the Article
12(3) declaration the Court may exercise jurisdiction retroactively from June
13, 2014.11
To complicate the picture further, in May 2018, Palestine submitted a
referral under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, requesting the ICC Prosecutor to
“investigate, in accordance with the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, past,
ongoing and future crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, committed in all
parts of the territory of the State of Palestine.”12 The referral takes note of the
ongoing preliminary examination, and argues that “given the acceleration of
settlement-related crimes and their irreversible effect on the lives of
Palestinians and on the prospects for a lasting peace, it is imperative that the
[ICC Prosecutor] immediately commence[s] an investigation into the crimes
herein referred as its highest priority.”13 The referral “specifies that the
circumstances relevant to the present referral include, but are not limited to, all
matters related to the Israeli settlement regime,” in particular “any conduct,
policies, laws, official decisions and practices that underlie, promote,
encourage or otherwise make a contribution to the commission of these
crimes.”14 While the referral does not change the nature or status of the
preliminary examination itself or impose any obligation on the ICC Prosecutor
to focus on the crimes highlighted in the referral, it does mean that should the
Prosecutor decide that the situation in Palestine warrants a full investigation,
her Office would not need to seek the authorization of the pre-trial chamber.15
Beyond these legal ramifications, it is worth noting that ICC interventions
16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083 [hereinafter OTP Jan. 2015 Press
Release].
10
The provision reads: “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required
under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with
the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.” Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 12(3), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Preliminary
examinations may be initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor either on the basis of a) information sent
by individuals or groups, states, inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations, or “other
reliable sources”; b) a referral from a state party or the U.N. Security Council; or c) a declaration
accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the court pursuant to article 12(3) lodged by a state which is
not a party to the Statute. See OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 73–
76.
11
Preliminary Examinations: Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, https://www.icccpi.int/palestine (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
12
THE STATE OF PALESTINE, REFERRAL BY THE STATE OF PALESTINE PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 13(A) AND
14 OF THE ROME STATUTE ¶ 9 (May 15, 2018) [hereinafter REFERRAL BY THE STATE OF PALESTINE]. See also
Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the Referral Submitted by Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF.
OF THE PROSECUTOR (May 22, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=180522-otp-stat
[hereinafter OTP Statement on the Referral Submitted by Palestine].
13
REFERRAL BY THE STATE OF PALESTINE, supra note 12 at ¶ 8.
14
Id. at ¶ 11.
15
See Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 12(3); see also OTP Statement on the Referral Submitted
by Palestine, supra note 12.
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triggered by state referrals tend to take a specific direction in that they usually
focus on actors that challenge the referring state, as opposed to members of the
referring government itself.16 They also tend to proceed quicker, perhaps in
part because of the enhanced cooperation offered by the referring state.17
In this sense, the examination in Palestine sets itself apart from other
situations involving allegations against states with significant resources in that
the legal basis for opening a potential investigation was initially to be found in
the Article 12(3) declaration by Palestine combined with the Prosecutor’s
proprio motu powers in Article 15, but subsequently in the referral made by
Palestine under Article 14. Accordingly, in this case a state party to the Rome
Statute is actively seeking to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction but that referral is
intended to target Israel, which is not a party to the Rome Statute. In contrast,
most other situations involving allegations against states with significant
resources do not involve state referrals and investigations are, or would be,
based on the Prosecutor’s use of the proprio motu powers.18 This may turn out
to be important because Palestinian authorities are expected to be forthcoming
(as are numerous Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations), providing
the Court with evidence and other forms of cooperation needed to take
potential cases forward, at least if they relate to alleged Israeli crimes.
The current preliminary examination came in the wake of a previous
unsuccessful attempt by Palestine to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC over
crimes in its territory. In 2012, the then–chief ICC Prosecutor Luis MorenoOcampo decided to close the preliminary examination relating to the situation
in Palestine on the grounds that Palestine did not amount to a state under the
Rome Statute. That decision was made on the basis that the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) had, at the time, not recognized Palestinian
statehood. The Prosecutor’s view, therefore, was that the Article 12(3)
declaration submitted by Palestine in 2009 could not be acted on since only
states can submit such declarations under the Rome Statute.19 What ultimately
proved central to the Prosecutor’s 2015 decision to proceed with an
examination in Palestine was, therefore, the UNGA’s vote in November 2012
to recognize Palestine as a non-member observer state.20 In turn, ICC
membership supports claims for Palestinian statehood, even if ratification of
treaties is not a formal criterion for assessing statehood under the Montevideo
16
See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Reflections on the ICC Prosecutor’s Recent ‘Selection
Decisions,’ 17 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 125, 151-152 (2013).
17
For an analysis of the duration of various preliminary examinations, see Sara Wharton & Rosemary
Grey, Preliminary Examinations: A Closer Look at One of the Most Important Parts of the ICC Office of
the Prosecutor’s Work, INTLAWGRRLS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://ilg2.org/2017/12/08/preliminaryexaminations-a-closer-look-at-one-of-the-most-important-parts-of-the-icc-office-of-the-prosecutors-work/.
18
However, the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine is based on an Article 12(3)
declaration. See infra Annex (for an outline of how other preliminary examinations and investigations
involving allegations against global or regional powers were initiated and their current status).
19
See Int’l Criminal Court [ICC]. Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities 2012, at ¶ 201 (Nov. 2012) (noting that “[i]n interpreting and applying article 12 of the Rome
Statute, the Office has assessed that it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly
of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State for the purpose
of acceding to the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under
article 12(1).”). For a discussion of (the lack of) Palestinian statehood at the time and its ramifications
for the ICC process, see Benoliel & Perry,
20
See OTP Jan. 2015 Press Release, supra note 9.
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Convention.21
B. NATURE AND STATUS OF THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
The Prosecutor does not enjoy full investigative powers at the preliminary
examination stage. Rather, a preliminary examination—largely unregulated in
the ICC’s legal framework—is primarily based on a review of documentary
evidence and aims at determining whether there is a basis for opening a formal
investigation.22 According to Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute, in making this
determination the Prosecutor shall consider issues of jurisdiction, admissibility
and the interests of justice.23 As noted above, the practice of the ICC
Prosecutor varies considerably in terms of how quickly preliminary
examinations proceed, making it difficult to predict when exactly a decision
will be made to either take forward or terminate the Palestine examination.
The Palestine examination has since December 2018 been placed in the socalled phase three, meaning that the Prosecutor focuses on assessing whether
statutory requirements relating admissibility are satisfied.24 This includes an
assessment of complementarity, whereby the existence of national proceedings
relating to the same conduct examined by the ICC could lead to a conclusion
of inadmissibility.25 Beyond this narrow legal assessment of complementarity
under Article 53(1) (cf. Article 17) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor
endorses a policy of promoting so-called “positive complementarity,”
understood as a question of “ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine
national proceedings.”26 As detailed below in this Article, the Prosecutor’s
understanding of existing legal processes in Israel and Palestine—as well as
the Office’s understanding of the potential for these to “improve” or for new
ones to occur—could prove decisive for whether, and if so, when the Palestine
examination proceeds to a full investigation.

21
See generally Bosco, supra note 5. See also Thomas Obel Hansen, What Are the Consequences of
Palestine Joining the International Criminal Court?, E-INT’L REL. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.eir.info/2015/04/06/what-are-the-consequences-of-palestine-joining-the-international-criminal-court/.
22
See generally Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and
Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 413 (2017). See id. at 414
(noting that “[t]he term ‘preliminary examinations’ has marginal importance in the Rome Statute. It
appears in Article 15(6) of the Statute, and indirectly in Article 42. It refers broadly speaking to a phase
that is ‘not yet an investigation’, but a ‘sort of pre-investigation carried out by the Prosecutor.’”
(footnote omitted)). Accordingly, as David Bosco notes, “the [office’s] discretion is broad during this
phase of the [C]ourt’s work [and n]either the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
offer any significant guidance on how to conduct preliminary examinations, although they do make
clear that the prosecutor may seek additional information and may take oral or written testimony during
this phase.” David Bosco, The International Criminal Court and Crime Prevention: Byproduct or
Conscious Goal, 19 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT’L L. 163 (2011) [hereinafter Byproduct or Conscious
Goal]. For a description of the steps typically taken by the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations,
see OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 85-88.
23
For a description of how this analysis is conducted, see OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary
Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 34–71.
24
2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2.
25
For a description of the assessments undertaken in phase three, including with respect to
complementarity, gravity and the concept of “interest of justice,” see generally OTP Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 42–71.
26
Id. at ¶¶ 5, 93.
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Meanwhile, the Prosecutor’s reports on preliminary examinations imply
that the assessment of subject-matter jurisdiction is not straightforward.
Whereas the preliminary examination formally progressed to phase three in
December 2018 and thus, in theory focuses on admissibility, issues relating to
subject-matter jurisdiction appear to continue to pose challenges for ICC
prosecutors. The 2018 Report on Preliminary Examinations Activities (2018
Report) notes that the Palestine examination has “raised specific challenges
relating to both factual and legal determinations,” including “possible
challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction, and to the scope of such jurisdiction.”27
This must be read in light of the 2017 Report on Preliminary Examinations
Activities (2017 Report) that suggested that the Prosecutor remains uncertain
whether a range of legal requirements relating to subject-matter jurisdiction are
satisfied in the Palestine situation, particularly highlighting two issues.
One issue relates to the legal regime applicable to the situation in the West
Bank. In the 2017 Report, the Prosecutor noted that multiple sources, including
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), have held that the West Bank and East Jerusalem should be
considered occupied territory, but also took note of the Israeli view that the
area should be seen as “disputed territory,” subject to competing claims, which
should result in the rejection of the “de jure application of the Geneva
Conventions to the territory.”28 Other than the general comment relating to
jurisdictional uncertainty mentioned above, the 2018 Report makes no specific
comments on this issue.
Another key issue relates to the legal characterization of the Gaza conflict.
The 2017 Report notes:
[T]he appropriate legal characterisation [sic] of the conflict
presents several difficulties in light of the sui generis nature
of the conflict. While most agree on the existence of an armed
conflict, the classification of the conflict as one of an
international or non-international character, or both existing
in parallel, remains subject to significant debate and diverging
views. The classification of the 2014 Gaza conflict has an
impact on the Office’s analysis of particular crimes allegedly
committed during the 2014 conflict. While a number of
crimes of possible relevance to the situation are substantially
similar in the context both of international and noninternational armed conflicts, certain war crimes provisions
under the Statute appear to be applicable to international
armed conflicts only.29

27

2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018, supra note 2, at ¶ 268.
2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 1, at ¶ 69.
Id. at ¶ 70. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage the debate as to whether Gaza should
be considered occupied territory. But see, e.g., Hanne Cuyckens, Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in
Gaza?, 63 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 275 (2016) (concluding that, “the effective control test at the core
of the law of occupation is no longer met and hence Gaza is no longer occupied. [But g]iven that
Israel nevertheless continues to exercise some degree of control over Gaza and its population, the
absence of occupation does not mean the absence of accountability. This responsibility is however
28
29
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The 2018 Report provides little additional clarification, even if the examination
has now progressed to focus on admissibility issues, which normally implies
that the Office has concluded its preliminary examination analysis of issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The report notes:
Based on the information available, the hostilities that took
place in Gaza between 7 July and 26 August 2014 may be
classified as either an international or non-international armed
conflict. Accordingly, the Office has taken into account the
possible alternative available classifications of the 2014
armed conflict and the related possible alternative legal
qualifications of the relevant alleged acts of the various
perpetrators. Such an approach, however, has implications for
any conclusions to be reached on the commission of
particular alleged crimes of relevance, given that certain war
crimes that are criminalised [sic] under the Statute provisions
relevant to international armed conflicts, are by contrast not
criminalised [sic] under the Statute in the case of a noninternational armed conflict. Consequently, the Office’s
conclusions on the commission of alleged crimes in some
instances depend on the qualification of the conflict as either
international or non-international in character.30
These are unusually transparent—some would say uncertain—comments for
the Office to make in reports on preliminary examinations regarding its
understanding of key legal issues, which suggest that these are likely to resurface in the context of a potential formal investigation.

II. CRIMES AND ACTORS UNDER ICC SCRUTINY IN THE PALESTINE
EXAMINATION, AND IMPLICATIONS FROM A COMPLEMENTARITY PERSPECTIVE

To understand the opportunities for, and challenges of, seeking
accountability for crimes in Palestine under the ICC’s complementarity
regime, it is necessary to set out the focus of the ICC’s preliminary
examination, including the crimes and actors currently under scrutiny.
A. CRIMES CURRENTLY UNDER SCRUTINY
The ICC examination has apparently focused on only a relatively
limited—albeit important—range of crimes. Specifically, the examination
currently involves an assessment of: settlements activities authorized by Israeli
authorities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; crimes allegedly committed
not founded on the law of occupation but on general international humanitarian law, potentially
complemented by international human rights law.”). See also Bosco, supra note 5, at 161.
30
2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶ 273.
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by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as well as Palestinian armed groups during
the conflict in Gaza between July 7 and August 26, 2014, known as the “the
2014 Gaza conflict”; and “other alleged conduct since 30 March 2018,”
including the 2018 protests along the Israel-Gaza border and Israeli responses
thereto.31
The situation in Palestine is similar to most other ICC situations targeting
the conduct of global and regional powers in that it focuses on crimes allegedly
committed by both parties to a conflict.32 However, it sets itself apart from
other such interventions in that one category of crimes under scrutiny relates to
a state-sanctioned policy of settlements and transfer of population.33 Even if
allegations against British and U.S. armed forces and the CIA suggest that
crimes were committed systematically and with some form of policy approval,
in no other situation involving a state with significant resources has the Court
focused explicitly on conduct that, if investigated, would almost certainly lead
the Prosecutor to examine individual criminal responsibility of the country’s
senior most officials and decision-makers.34 This helps explain Israel’s
response to the ICC intervention, discussed further below in this Article.
How then is the ICC Prosecutor describing the conduct subject to analysis
in the preliminary examination? Details regarding wording matter in the
context of the Prosecutor’s reporting on preliminary examinations, and there
are some notable changes in the Prosecutor’s assessments in the most recent
November 2017 and December 2018 reports on preliminary examinations.
For one, previous reports explicitly cited to allegations of crimes
committed by Hamas,35 but the 2017 Report spoke only in more generic terms
about crimes allegedly committed by “Palestinian armed groups.”36 While
referring to Hamas and other named Palestinian armed groups as parties to the
2014 conflict in Gaza, the 2018 Report continues to refer to alleged crimes by
“Palestinian armed groups.”37 This is an unusual turn that could possibly
suggest that this aspect of the examination has not moved forward as “normal”
(if there is anything such as “normal” in the context of preliminary
examinations), since the Prosecutor tends to be more specific concerning the
actors allegedly responsible for the crimes examined as the preliminary
examination proceeds.38

31

Id. at ¶¶ 269–75.
The situation in Iraq stands out in this regard, as it involves allegations against one actor only,
namely British service personnel. See infra Annex.
33
Id.
34
See also David Bosco, How to Avoid Getting Hauled Before The Hague, FOREIGN POL’Y. (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/01/how-to-avoid-getting-hauled-before-the-hague-palestine-internationalcriminal-court/ [hereinafter How to Avoid].
35
Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities 2016, at ¶ 125 (Nov. 2016) [hereinafter 2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities].
36
2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, at ¶ 66.
37
2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 260–67, 274.
38
By way of example, in the preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, the
Prosecutor initially referred to acts of torture by “various parties to the conflict,” but later publicly
identified specific actors as alleged perpetrators, including U.S. armed forces and the CIA. Compare
Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
2011, at ¶ 26 (Dec. 2011), with 2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra
note 1, at ¶ 255.
32
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At the same time, it is noteworthy that the most recent reports on
preliminary examination activities provide additional details concerning
alleged crimes relating to Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem. Importantly, the reports suggest that the preliminary
examination specifically covers political actors at the highest level, noting that
“[i]n March 2017, for the first time in decades, Israel’s security cabinet
reportedly approved the construction of an entirely new settlement.”39 Leaving
aside here the legal and diplomatic obstacles associated with pursuing
accountability for incumbent political leaders, this sends a strong message to
the Israeli leadership that decisions relating to settlement activities are being
scrutinized from the perspective of individual criminal accountability. Equally
important, the 2017 Report cites to UNSC Resolution 2334 of December 23,
2016, which reaffirmed the occupied status of the West Bank, and explicitly
condemned the “construction and expansion of settlements, transfer of Israeli
settlers, confiscation of land, demolition of homes and displacement of
Palestinian civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law and
relevant resolutions.”40 Some commentators believe this should be seen to
suggest that the Prosecutor “may feel freer than ever before to treat Israeli
settlements in the West Bank as war crimes.”41 What seems clear is that the
UNSC resolution adds substantial legitimacy for the Prosecutor to further
pursue the settlement activities as a crime that can be prosecuted under the
Rome Statute; although some permanent members of the UNSC, in particular
the U.S., will almost certainly not condone an ICC investigation of Israeli
settlements and would likely target the Court or Court officials, if it does.42
B. MONITORING OF OTHER CRIMES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
Even if other reported crimes—including more recent ones—are only

39

2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 1, at ¶ 61.
Id. at ¶ 69 [citations omitted]. Demonstrating how political leaders seek to instrumentalize the
legal process, following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2334, Palestinian authorities immediately
advocated for the opening of a full investigation, calling on the ICC Prosecutor “to expedite her initial
examination into settlements and subsequently proceed to opening a full investigation, now that [the
UNSC] has established that they are illegal.” Adam Ragson & Yonah J. Bob, Following UNSC
Resolution, PLO Wants ICC to Open Full Investigation Into Settlements, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 28,
2016), https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinian-Official-PLO-wants-ICC-to-open-fullinvestigation-into-settlements-476755 (citations omitted).
41
Yonah J. Bob, Four Main Take-ways From ICC Report on Israel-Palestinians, JERUSALEM POST
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Four-main-take-aways-from-ICC-report-on-IsraelPalestinians-517006.
42
See generally John B. Bellinger III, The International Criminal Court and the Trump Administration,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: BLOG (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-criminal-court-andtrump-administration; Adam Entous, Donald Trump’s New World Order, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order. It is worth recalling that
President Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, is a fierce opponent of the ICC and that the
administration has often taken a more pro-Israeli stand on key issues compared to previous U.S. administrations.
In 2018, Bolton delivered the so far hardest attack on the ICC, threatening U.S. sanctions and other measures,
citing among other issues to the Court’s intervention in Palestine. See Full Text of John Bolton’s Speech to the
Federalist Society, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-boltonspeech-federalist-society-180910172828633.html.
40
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broadly referred to in the recent reports on preliminary examinations,43 the ICC
Prosecutor continues to monitor developments in Palestine. Notably, on April
8, 2018, Prosecutor Bensouda issued a statement, stating that “[i]t is with grave
concern that I note the violence and deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip in
the context of recent mass demonstrations.”44 The Prosecutor further observed
that since March 30, 2018, “at least 27 Palestinians have been reportedly killed
by the Israeli Defence [sic] Forces, with over a thousand more injured, many,
as a result of shootings using live ammunition and rubber-bullets,” which
“could constitute crimes under the Rome Statute . . . as could the use of
civilian presence for the purpose of shielding military activities.”45 The
Prosecutor reminded all parties that the situation in Palestine is under
preliminary examination, emphasizing that “any new alleged crime committed
in the context of the situation in Palestine may be subjected to [the] Office’s
scrutiny.”46
Israeli, Palestinian, and international media widely reported on the
Prosecutor’s statement.47 Prior to the Prosecutor’s statement, Palestinian
foreign minister Riyad al-Malki had submitted a letter to the Prosecutor in
which he denounced the “escalation of unlawful practices by Israel” in Gaza
and called on the ICC to “stop Israel [from] violating international laws ‘in
respect of children that may amount to a violation of Israel’s obligations.’”48
Hours after the Prosecutor issued her statement, the IDF leadership announced
that it would launch an inquiry into the conduct of its troops in the recent
incidents in Gaza.49 Leaving aside whether this is likely to be a credible
inquiry, the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) announcement suggests that Israeli
authorities are closely monitoring and appear to take the ICC activities
seriously. Previously, in January 2018, Israel’s National Security Council
warned members of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that
the ICC was likely to move from the examination to the investigation phase

43
The 2018 Report states: “The Office has gathered information regarding other crimes allegedly
committed by both sides in relation to the violence that has occurred in the context of the protests held
along the Israel-Gaza border since 30 March 2018. These and any other alleged crimes that may occur
require further assessment.” 2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶
275.
44
See Fatou Bensouda, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
Regarding the Worsening Situation in Gaza, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF.OF PROSECUTOR (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=180408-otp-stat. [hereinafter Prosecutor Bensouda’s Statement].
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Chief ICC Lawyer Calls for End to Violence Along Gaza Border,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/chief-icc-lawyer-calls-forend-to-violence-along-gaza-border; Israeli Army Orders Investigation of its Response to Gaza Border
Protests, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.jta.org/2018/04/08/newsopinion/idf-orders-investigation-militarys-response-gaza-border-protests.
48
Palestinians Appeal to ICC to Halt Alleged Israeli Crimes, TIMES ISRAEL (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinians-appeals-to-icc-to-halt-alleged-israeli-crimes/.
49
See Israel to Probe Gaza Border Deaths Avoiding International Investigation, ASHARQ ALAWSAT (Apr. 10, 2018), https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1232846/israel-probe-gaza-borderdeaths-avoiding-international-investigation.
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soon with respect to alleged Israeli crimes.50
More generally, Israel’s response to the ICC’s activity in Palestine has
varied over time. The most aggressive responses include making efforts to
prevent Palestine from joining the ICC; labeling the Court as “anti-Israeli,”
stating it will demand from its allies that they stop funding the Court; and
making it clear that it will take action to “dismantle” the ICC.51 However, the
Israeli government has recently used a more conciliatory tone towards the ICC,
including opening a “dialogue” with the Prosecutor and helping to facilitate a
visit of her Office to Israel and Palestine in October 2016, involving outreach
and education activities.52 Yet, as detailed below in this Article, this change in
attitude towards the ICC does not appear to be accompanied by any substantial
change in terms of its approach to domestic inquiries into crimes under the
ICC’s examination.
In simpler terms, the ICC process impacts decision-makers in Israel and
Palestine, although—as discussed in more detail below in this Article—it is far
from certain this will prove to be an example of what ICC prosecutors and
commentators refer to as positive complementarity.
C. WHAT ACTORS ARE LIKELY TO BE SUBJECT TO A POTENTIAL INVESTIGATION?
Should the preliminary examination proceed to a full investigation, what
actors are then most likely to be the focus of such an investigation? Some
commentators suggest that the Prosecutor may be inclined, at least in the first
place, to pursue only members of Hamas for rocket attacks on civilians,
because these “would be by far the easiest of all the crimes to prosecute” and
because it may be seen by the Prosecutor as politically more feasible.53 In the
view of this Author, the Prosecutor would be well advised to pursue both
Palestinian and Israeli actors, including those responsible for unlawful
50
Alan Baker notes that the report states that the “opening of an investigation has serious
implications for Israel,” but also “refer[ring] to differing views within Israel’s justice and foreign affairs
ministries as to the seriousness of this issue, [the report] holds that these ministries nevertheless view
the matter with concern and appreciate the need to deal with it at the legal and political levels to remove
the threat.” Alan Baker, Palestinian Manipulation of the International Criminal Court, JERUSALEM
CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (Jan. 21, 2018), http://jcpa.org/will-the-international-criminal-court-disregardinternational-law/. Alan Baker also notes that it is “unclear if the fears of the Israeli National Security
Council are based on solid information emanating from the Office of the ICC Prosecutor, or merely on
conjecture.” Id.
51
See generally Mark Kersten, In Its Fight Against the ICC, Israel Takes a Page Out of John
Bolton’s Playbook, JUST. CONFLICT (Jan. 20, 2015), https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/01/20/in-its-fightagainst-the-icc-israel-takes-a-page-out-of-john-boltons-playbook/ (outlining the Israeli government’s
behavior and statements); Mark Kersten, The International Criminal Court Can and Should Investigate
Violence in Gaza, JUST. CONFLICT (May 17, 2018), https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/05/17/theinternational-criminal-court-can-and-should-investigate-violence-in-gaza/.
52
See Tom Miles, Israel ‘Engaging’ with ICC over Gaza War Crimes Inquiry: Prosecutor,
REUTERS (June 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-icc-idUSKCN0YP1CT;
see also 2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 35, at ¶ 143; Statement of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Ahead of the Office’s Visit to
Israel and Palestine from 5 to 10 October 2016, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF. OF PROSECUTOR (Oct. 5, 2016)
(emphasizing that the purpose of the visit was to “undertake outreach and education activities,” but not
to “engage in evidence collection in relation to any alleged crimes,” “undertake site visits” or “assess
the adequacy of the respective legal systems to deal with crimes that fall within ICC jurisdiction.”).
53
See Kevin J. Heller, The ICC in Palestine: Be Careful What You Wish For, JUST. CONFLICT (Apr.
2, 2015), https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/02/the-icc-in-palestine-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/.
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settlement activities.
First, an exclusive focus on crimes by one actor would almost certainly
lead to a new backlash against the Prosecutor for being biased—and should the
focus be Palestinian armed groups, criticism for targeting less resourceful
parties to conflicts.54 This could easily undermine perceptions of the legitimacy
of the ICC’s intervention in Palestine—and the legitimacy of the Court more
broadly—among crucial audiences, including civil society and academia.
Second, there would be significant symbolic value in pursuing Israeli
violations, in particular settlement activities, as international crimes. It is
widely acknowledged that settlements have a severe impact on the Palestinian
people as a whole and the prospects for a resolution of the conflict.55 Other
efforts to condemn and put a stop to unlawful Israeli settlement policies and
practices, including UNSC resolutions, have proven unsuccessful so far.56
Adding the dimension of international criminalization would signal clearly the
level of international outrage of Israel’s decision to continue and expand
settlements in blatant violation of international law. In the best case, it could
also create a level of deterrence. Although the capacity of the ICC to deter
international crimes is widely disputed,57 the opening of a formal investigation
that covers settlement activities is likely to make Israeli decision-makers at
least consider the ramifications of being indicted by an international court.
Third, as settlement activities are endorsed as a matter of state policy, they
would be relatively straightforward to prove, at least in terms of facts pointing
to their occurrence and official authorization.58 One common barrier in
prosecuting international crimes committed by states with significant resources
is that plans or policies authorizing or condoning the crimes are typically not
written down, making it hard to find “smoking guns.” For example, one key
challenge advancing accountability for those most responsible for detainee
abuse by U.K. forces in Iraq is that such crimes appear to have taken place on
the basis of an institutionally embedded informal system not revealed by any

54
For an example of such criticism, see William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice,
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 545 (2013). For an example of criticism specifically concerning the failure of
the ICC to proceed with an investigation in Palestine, see also John Dugard, Palestine and the
International Criminal Court: Institutional Failure or Bias? 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 563 (2013). For a
more general account of the difficult selection decisions facing the ICC, see Darryl Robinson,
Inescapable Dyads: Why the ICC Cannot Win, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L CRIM. L. 323 (2015).
55
See, e.g., Rachelle Marshall, Israeli Settlements Come at a High Price, 35 WASH. REP. ON
MIDDLE EAST AFF. 8 (2016).
56
See, e.g., Meeting Coverage, Security Council, Settlement Expansion, Jerusalem Embassy
Decision Eroding Prospects for Peace in Middle East, Special Coordinator Tells Security Council (Mar.
28, 2018).
57
See generally James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009); Hyeran Jo & Beth A.
Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443 (2016); Jan
Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B.
INT’L L. 249 (2001); Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International
Justice, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191 (2010); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473 (1999).
58
As noted above, the 2017 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities takes note that Israel’s
security cabinet has reportedly approved the construction of new settlements, something that would be
straightforward to prove. See 2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 1, at
¶ 61.
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written trail.59 Accordingly, the ICC Prosecutor may have easier access to
certain forms of evidence in the situation in Palestine, compared to other
situations covering global and regional powers.
Finally, because settlement activities are not subject to any criminal justice
inquiry domestically, for reasons set out below in this Article, pursuing this
category of crimes would pose far fewer challenges for the ICC under the
complementarity regime compared to other reported crimes in the Palestine
situation.
Of course, any move by the ICC to investigate and potentially prosecute
Israeli officials responsible for settlement activities would bring the Court into
a direct confrontation with Israel, and its key ally, the U.S., which may prove
difficult, if not impossible, for Court officials to manage. Yet recent moves by
the Prosecutor suggest her Office is entering new territory and has become
increasingly willing to directly challenge the interests of global and regional
powers. Notably, in late 2017, the Prosecutor almost simultaneously decided to
proceed to phase three of the examination in Iraq, covering war crimes
allegedly committed by British service personnel, and requested the Chamber’s
authorization to open an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan, covering
war crimes allegedly committed by U.S. armed forces and the CIA.60 This
obviously does not mean that the ICC will succeed in holding accountable
military commanders or officials of Western powers, but it does suggest that an
escalation of the ICC’s intervention in Palestine, including a formal
investigation of Israeli settlement activities, may not be as far-fetched as many
observers seem to think.61 Israel will carefully watch how the Prosecutor
proceeds in other situations relating to global and regional powers, in particular
in terms of prioritizing investigation of military commanders and state
officials, as such actions could set a precedent for how prosecutors will
proceed in the Palestine examination.
Taken together, the above analysis indicates that should a formal
investigation be opened, it could likely focus on both Palestinian and Israeli
actors, including those responsible for authorizing the highly controversial
settlement activities. As will be discussed in the following Part IV, this has
significant ramifications for how the ICC’s complementarity regime could play
out in the Palestine situation.

III. THE LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLEMENTARITY

59

See Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq, supra note 8.
See 2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 1, at ¶ 203; The
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorisation to
Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, INT’L CRIM. CT.
OFF. OF PROSECUTOR (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otpstat-afgh [hereinafter OTP Afghanistan Investigation Request]. For a discussion of the prospects of
bringing cases against U.S. armed forces and the CIA, see also Thomas Obel Hansen, International
Criminal Court Indictments of U.S. Officials are not Impossible, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/50638/international-criminal-court-indictment-u-s-officials-impossible/.
61
For an example of such skepticism, see Heller, supra note 53; Kontorovich, supra note 6.
60
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As the ICC Prosecutor has progressed the Palestine examination to phase
three, it is necessary to set out how the Office of the Prosecutor approaches the
assessment of complementarity at this stage and to ask what the outcome
should be of this assessment.
A. COMPLEMENTARITY ASSESSMENT AT THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION STAGE
The principle of complementarity is enshrined in Article 17(1)(a) of the
Rome Statute, which provides that “the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where [] [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”62 Importantly, the Appeals
Chamber has endorsed a distinction, according to which Article 17 must be
applied differently depending on the stage of the ICC proceedings.63 At the
preliminary stages, where the Rome Statute speaks of a “situation” as opposed
to a “case,”64 and when the suspects have not yet been (publicly) identified, the
Appeals Chamber has noted that the inadmissibility test should be based on the
question of whether the relevant state is investigating the same overall conduct
that is being examined by the ICC.65 In contrast, when a full investigation at
the ICC level is launched, domestic proceedings “must cover the same
individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings
before the Court.”66
The Prosecutor’s policy paper on preliminary examination states that the
Office’s assessment of complementarity at the preliminary examination stage
focuses on “potential cases that would likely arise from an investigation into
the situation,” defined by factors such as:
(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the
focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future
case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
allegedly committed during the incidents that are likely to be
the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the
future case(s).67
This is significant because states cannot avoid the opening of an ICC
investigation by simply investigating or prosecuting any crime or persons
relating to the overall conduct examined by the ICC; instead, it needs to be the
specific persons and crimes that are subject to the Prosecutor’s scrutiny.

62

Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 17.
As such, the Appeals Chamber has noted that Article 17 applies to the determination of
admissibility at the preliminary stages under Articles 15 and 18 of the Rome Statute (and the
Prosecutor’s decision under Article 53(1)) as well as the determination of admissibility under Article 19
where a suspect, or a state with jurisdiction, challenges the admissibility of a specific case. See
Prosecutor v Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-274, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya
against the Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011, ¶ 37 (Aug. 20, 2011).
64
See Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 13–15, 18.
65
See Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-274 at ¶ 38.
66
Id. at ¶ 39.
67
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 43.
63
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Because it is often unclear to the public and the affected state who exactly
these persons are at the preliminary examination stage, this may complicate
efforts by states—both those genuinely committed to accountability and those
not—to avoid the opening of an ICC investigation with reference to the ICC’s
complementarity regime. Turned around, the limited transparency offered by
this framework means that the ICC Prosecutor is, in reality, left with a
significant amount of discretion, which may, at least in theory, be used to
promote accountability domestically with reference to the policy objective of
positive complementarity.68
B. “INACTIVITY”?
Chambers of the Court have established that the determination of
complementarity must rely on a two-fold test, whereby any assessment of
unwillingness or inability takes place only if it has first been established that
there is relevant investigatory or prosecutorial activity in the state concerned.69
Chambers of the Court have made it clear that such activity can only be said to
exist if investigations at the national level are ongoing, as opposed to some
future planned or scheduled investigations.70 Further, Chambers have clarified
that it is insufficient for a state with jurisdiction over the crimes to merely
claim that there is an ongoing investigation. Instead, there must be “concrete
evidence of such steps.”71
Should there be a total absence of any investigatory or prosecutorial
activity domestically—as is the case with respect to Israeli settlement
activities72 as well as alleged Palestinian crimes during the 2014 Gaza

68
Unlike later stages, the determination of admissibility at the preliminary examination stage rests
with the Prosecutor with no possibilities for judicial review. As a result, although the Rome Statute does
provide for a consultation process with the affected state(s), states who are subject to scrutiny on the
basis of a referral under Article 14 of the Statute cannot necessarily avoid the opening of an
investigation if the Prosecutor determines that the admissibility standards are met. Questions of
admissibility at later stages are decided by Chambers of the Court, either on their own motion or at the
request of the accused or the affected state. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 18–19.
69
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment on the Appeal against the
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, at ¶ 78 (Sept. 25,
2009).
70
See generally Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-96, Decision on the Application by the
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the
Statute, ¶ 59 (May 30, 2011).
71
See generally id. ¶ 16 (whereas the Chamber held that “[a state] lodging an admissibility
challenge bears the burden of proof,” this does, self-evidently, not apply at the preliminary examination
stage).
72
See 2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶ 277. As
acknowledged by the ICC Prosecutor, there has been some legal activity relating to settlement issues,
but this has not taken the form of criminal investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for
authorizing and implementing the settlement regime as such. Israeli courts have refused to entertain the
matter of whether the settlement regime is lawful. As David Bosco notes, whereas Palestinian groups
and Israeli human rights advocates regularly challenge Israeli occupation practices in court, “for all its
independence, the top Israeli court has repeatedly avoided the question of whether Israeli settlements in
the West Bank are legal.” How to Avoid, supra note 34 (further noting that “[i]n a series of cases, the
Supreme Court has punted, deciding that settlements are a political question that should be resolved
through international negotiations”); see also Michael Schaeffer Omer-Man, Israel’s High Court Just
Made an ICC Investigation More Likely, +972 (May 29, 2018), https://972mag.com/israels-high-courtjust-made-an-icc-investigation-more-likely/135789/ (observing that “[i]n the case of the settlements, the
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conflict73—the conclusion would seem straightforward: The ICC Prosecutor
can only conclude that there remains a situation of “inactivity,” and on this
basis proceed to a full investigation, if there is a finding that other statutory
requirements are satisfied. However, as discussed below in this Article, even in
such situations the policy objective of positive complementarity may lead ICC
Prosecutors to give national authorities more time to put in place, or improve,
existing legal proceedings, if the Office perceives that there is a possibility that
such domestic legal activity may be activated by action taken by the Office, or
for other reasons. Even if the Palestine examination progressed to phase three
in December 2018, and the Prosecutor has noted that she “intends to complete
the preliminary examination as early as possible,”74 it is certainly a possibility
that the Palestine examination will remain an examination for years to come,
with the Prosecutor making some form of reference to positive
complementarity.75 However, as this Article argues, this is not an option that is
likely to advance accountability in the Palestine situation.
Where some form of investigatory or prosecutorial activity relating to the
crimes under ICC examination exists—as is the case for alleged Israeli crimes
committed during the 2014 Gaza conflict—the ICC Prosecutor’s analysis is
less straightforward. In such situations, one factor relevant to the ICC
Prosecutor’s assessment of “activity” is whether there is an “absence of an
adequate legislative framework.”76 Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
emphasizes that the system for investigating alleged crimes by Israel’s armed
forces is impartial, complies with international standards, and “compares
favourably [sic] with the investigative mechanisms of other democratic
countries.”77 Independent observers tend to be more critical. Notably, the U.N.
court has issued countless rulings on the legality of individual settler homes, and sometimes even entire
settlements, but it has consistently refused to adjudicate the legality of the broader policy of creating
settlements themselves under international law”). On the Israeli legal processes, see also David
Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 (885) INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 207 (2012).
73
Human Rights Watch notes that the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza
are not known to have carried out any investigations of alleged war crimes committed by Palestinian
armed groups, including the deliberate or indiscriminate firing on civilians in Israel. See Human Rights
Watch,
Palestine:
ICC
Should
Open
Formal
Probe
(June
5,
2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/palestine-icc-should-open-formal-probe.
74
2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶ 284.
75
See also Bosco, supra note 5 (noting that the “preliminary examination will almost certainly be a
slow, deliberate process,” emphasizing that the ongoing Israeli investigations of its own conduct may
provide the ICC Prosecutor a “reason to delay a final decision”).
76
This includes among other issues an assessment of “the existence of laws that serve as a bar to
domestic proceedings, such as amnesties, immunities or statutes of limitation.” See OTP Policy Paper
on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 48.
77
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict, MFA.GOV (June 14, 2015), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/IsraelInvestigation-of-Alleged-Violations-of-Law-of-Armed-Conflict.aspx. The Ministry states that “Israel
maintains a multi-layered investigations system, with numerous checks and balances to ensure impartiality
before investigative, administrative, and judicial authorities. Israel's military justice system, and its
procedures for investigating possible violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, are continually reviewed
and updated. The three main components of the military justice system are the Military Advocate General's
Corps (“MAG Corps”), the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division (“MPCID”), and the
independent Military Courts. Moreover, Israel's military justice system is subject to civilian oversight by
the Attorney General of Israel, and subject to judicial review by Israel's Supreme Court, which has adopted
doctrines of standing and justiciability that readily allow for petitions regarding IDF activity. In 2010, the
Government of Israel created an independent public commission of inquiry headed by a former Justice of
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Commission of Inquiry expresses concern about “a number of procedural,
structural and substantive shortcomings, which continue to compromise
Israel’s ability to adequately fulfil its duty to investigate.”78 Whereas the
Commission notes the steps taken by Israel towards bringing its system of
investigations into compliance with international standards, it emphasizes that
flaws remain with respect to the State’s “adherence to international standards”
and concludes that “significant further changes are required to ensure that
Israel adequately fulfils [sic] its duty to investigate, prosecute and hold
perpetrators of alleged violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law accountable.”79 Israel’s state comptroller
similarly points to shortcomings in the legal framework.80 Yet it is not
particularly likely that the ICC Prosecutor will conclude there is a situation of
inactivity on the basis that Israel’s legal framework is inadequate. The Office
has never made such a determination in any situation under examination to
date, and Israel, with its comparatively sophisticated legal system, is not an
obvious candidate to become the first country to be subject to such a
judgment.81 The reports on preliminary examinations do not suggest that this is
even an issue being considered by ICC prosecutors.
Another factor, which could in theory prove decisive to the ICC
Prosecutor’s assessment of “activity” with respect to the allegations
surrounding the 2014 Gaza conflict, is whether there is a “deliberate focus of
proceedings on low-level or marginal perpetrators despite evidence on those
more responsible.”82 In some situations, the Office observed that it is not
sufficient that a limited number of direct physical perpetrators were prosecuted
where evidence points to systematic crimes, and on that basis proceeded to
request the Chamber’s authorization of an investigation.83 Israel’s Ministry of
Israel's Supreme Court and that included distinguished international legal observers (the “Turkel
Commission”). Following a comprehensive review, the Turkel Commission concluded in 2013 that Israel's
mechanisms for examining and investigating complaints and claims of violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict generally comply with its obligations under international law, and made a number of
recommendations to improve these mechanisms further. The Turkel Commission also found that Israel's
system compares favourably [sic] with the investigative mechanisms of other democratic countries,
including Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.” Id.
78
Comm’n of Inquiry, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry
Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1, ¶ 618, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4
(June 24, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Independent Commission].
79
Id. at ¶ 662.
80
An investigation launched by the state comptroller in January 2015 and published in March 2018
noted that Israel’s legislation concerning war crimes is not fully in line with international law; that the
IDF’s reporting procedure only covers deliberate attacks on civilians (and hence not all war crimes);
and that the IDF has no effective investigation policy of allegations of war crimes. See STATE
COMPTROLLER, OPERATION ‘PROTECTIVE EDGE’: IDF ACTIVITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO MECHANISMS OF EXAMINATION AND
OVERSIGHT OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ECHELONS (Mar, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 REPORT BY STATE
COMPTROLLER].
81
As David Bosco notes, “Israel has an active, respected, and independent judiciary that is unique
in the region. Its Supreme Court, in particular, enjoys a strong international reputation and has several
times challenged sensitive government policies, including in the occupied territories.” See How to
Avoid, supra note 34.
82
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 48. Besides the two factors
cited here, the Prosecutor also refers to “other, more general issues related to the lack of political will or
judicial capacity.” Id.
83
For example, with respect to domestic accountability processes covering members of the Afghan
authorities, the Office implies that in light of the allegations of widespread ill-treatment of detainees, it
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Foreign Affairs stated that “Israel is aware of allegations that certain IDF
actions during the 2014 Gaza Conflict violated international law [and] Israel
reviews complaints and other information it receives suggesting IDF
misconduct, regardless of the source, and is committed to investigating fully
any credible accusation or reasonable suspicion of a serious violation of the
Law of Armed Conflict.”84 Whereas Israel has conducted various inquiries and
investigations into the actions of members of its armed forces during the 2014
Gaza conflict, the scope of these investigations is limited and they appear to
focus exclusively on low-level perpetrators.85 In a June 2016 report, Human
Rights Watch observed that there had been no “meaningful progress in
providing justice for serious laws-of-war violations during the 2014 conflict,”
emphasizing that whereas “Israeli military inquiries into the 2014 Gaza
hostilities are ongoing[,] [t]hus far [only] two soldiers have been charged with
looting about US$600 from a Palestinian home and a third with covering it
up.”86 In August 2018, the IDF closed its largest investigation into incidents
relating to the 2014 Gaza conflict, known as the “Black Friday probe,” without
recommending that any charges be brought.87 The report by the U.N.
Commission of Inquiry implies that the very limited scope of Israeli
investigations covering the 2014 Gaza conflict is no coincidence, noting that
“[i]n many cases, individual soldiers may have been following agreed military
policy, but it is the policy itself that may violate the laws of war.”88 Again,
however, recent reports on preliminary examinations make no suggestion that
ICC prosecutors are concerned about a deliberate focus on low-level
perpetrators. Indeed, the 2018 Report simply notes that “[w]ith respect to

does not view it as sufficient that authorities have prosecuted only two National Directorate of Security
officials. See 2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 35, at ¶ 217.
84
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 77.
85
Levy and Rozenzweig note that Israel’s Military Advocate General Corps has received about 100
communications regarding “irregular events” during the 2014 Gaza conflict, which were forwarded to the new
General Staff investigative apparatus (used for the first time in connection with this operation) for further
investigation, and that, additionally, the “Military Advocate General opened 19 criminal investigations against
soldiers who were suspected of violations of the laws of warfare,” but “not a single soldier has been tried, not even
at the disciplinary hearing level.” See Bar Levy & Shir Rozenzweig, Israel and the International Criminal Court:
A Legal Battlefield, 19 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 129, 135 (2016). For the official description of the General Staff
Mechanism for Fact-Finding Assessments (the ‘FFA Mechanism’), which examines “exceptional incidents that
occurred during Operation Protective Edge,” see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Under Fire: Operation
Protective Edge, MFA.GOV (Sept. 10, 2014) http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/IDFinvestigating-exceptional-incidents-from-Operation-Protective-Edge-10-Sep-2014.aspx. For a more optimistic
account of the Israeli accountability efforts, see Oler, supra note 6, at 1008 (arguing that it is “imperative to
recognize the extensive and substantial steps taken by the Israelis themselves to investigate alleged crimes by
Operation Protective Edge participants”).
86
Human Rights Watch, supra note 73.
87
See Yonah J. Bob, IDF Closes Largest War Crime Probe of 2014 Gaza War, JERUSALEM POST
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IDF-closes-largest-war-crimes-probe-of-2014Gaza-war-564946.
88
See Report of the Independent Commission, supra note 78, at ¶¶ 640–41 (further noting that
Israeli investigations focus “on so-called ‘exceptional incidents’ suggesting a rather narrow approach,
which may fail to take into account violations of international law that result from an intentional policy
or military command, which itself may fail to comply with international legal obligations . . . In the
latest round of violence, no action is known to have been taken by the MAG, in the case of military
commanders, and by the Attorney General, with respect to military and civilian leadership, to initiate
investigations into the role of senior officials.”). The report by Israel’s state comptroller also points to a
range of flaws relating to inquiries into the decision-making process and military action in Gaza in
2014. See 2018 REPORT BY STATE COMPTROLLER, supra note 80.
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crimes allegedly committed by members of the IDF [in Gaza], the information
available indicates that all of the relevant incidents are or have been the subject
of some form of investigative activities at the national level within the IDF
military justice system.”89
The existence of investigatory activity, which appears to focus solely on
low-level perpetrators, is a common challenge in situations under the ICC’s
scrutiny, including in situations involving states with significant resources and
sophisticated legal systems.90 However, because the scope and outcome of
such proceedings are surrounded by a level of uncertainty, they may work to
complicate and delay the Prosecutor’s complementarity assessment, or simply
lead the Prosecutor to conclude that complementarity precludes further action
by the Office.91
C. “ABILITY” AND “WILLINGNESS”?
Should the ICC Prosecutor conclude that there is not a “situation of
inactivity,” the Office will proceed to the second step of the complementarity
assessment involving an assessment of whether the relevant state is able and
willing to investigate and prosecute the crimes.
The Prosecutor’s assessment of ability at the preliminary examination
stage entails an analysis of “whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to collect the
necessary evidence and testimony, unable to obtain the accused, or is otherwise
unable to carry out its proceedings.”92 As noted above, it is not particularly
likely that the Prosecutor will observe that Israel’s legal system is altogether
89

2018 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 2, at ¶ 279.
By way of example, in the situation in Afghanistan, the Prosecutor observes: “Although the US
[sic] has asserted that it has conducted thousands of investigations into detainee abuse, to the extent
discernible, such investigations and/or prosecutions appear to have focused on alleged acts committed
by direct physical perpetrators and/or their immediate superiors. None of the investigations appear to
have examined the criminal responsibility of those who developed, authorised [sic] or bore oversight
responsibility for the implementation by members of the US [sic] armed forces of the interrogation
techniques that resulted in the alleged commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” See
2017 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 1, at ¶ 268. Similarly,
investigatory activity in the U.K. relating to the Iraq allegations has so far apparently focused mainly on
direct physical perpetrators, as opposed to the possible liability of commanders and decision-makers
who were reportedly responsible for creating or sustaining a system and culture that permitted regular
abuse of detainees. See also Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq, supra note 8, at 423–24.
91
See Human Rights Watch, Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice (May 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/03/pressure-point-iccs-impact-national-justice/lessons-colombiageorgia-guinea-and [hereinafter Pressure Point] (noting that there is a risk that “domestic authorities
producing a certain amount of activity—opening of case files and limited investigative steps—to stave
off ICC intervention, but without following through with prosecutions”). Yet, the Prosecutor
demonstrated in the Afghanistan probe that the Office is ultimately prepared to request the opening of a
full investigation in situations where long-lasting domestic accountability measures focus only on direct
physical perpetrators; see also OTP Afghanistan Investigation Request, supra note 60.
92
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 56. In conducting this
evaluation, the Office considers, inter alia, “the ability of the competent authorities to exercise their
judicial powers in the territory concerned; the absence of conditions of security for witnesses,
investigators, prosecutors and judges or the lack of adequate protection systems; the absence of the
required legislative framework to prosecute the same conduct or forms of responsibility; the lack of
adequate resources for effective investigations and prosecutions; as well as violations of fundamental
rights of the accused.” Id. at ¶ 57.
90
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unable to conduct investigations and proceedings even with respect to complex
international crimes cases. However, the question of ability will require
particular attention with respect to crimes falling under the jurisdiction of
Palestinian authorities, especially in light of their own admission that “its
failure to open investigations results from insufficient means to carry out
investigations in a territory over which it has yet to re-establish unified
control.”93 This could easily lead the Prosecutor to conclude that cases relating
to alleged crimes by Palestinian armed groups are admissible since Palestine is
unable to investigate.94
The Prosecutor’s assessment of unwillingness to investigate or prosecute at
the preliminary examination stage involves an analysis of the standards
mentioned in Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute, including whether:
(a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, (b) there
has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice, and (c) the proceedings were or
are not conducted independently or impartially and in a
manner consistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.95
As this partly overlaps with the standards that are assessed under “activity,”
this Article will focus here on the issue of “unjustified delay in the
proceedings.”96 In that regard, it is noteworthy that the Office’s Policy Paper
on Preliminary Examinations observes that delays in national proceedings may
be assessed in light of indicators “such as, the pace of investigative steps and
proceedings; whether the delay in the proceedings can be objectively justified
in the circumstances; and whether there is evidence of a lack of intent to bring
the person(s) concerned to justice.”97 Suggesting that the intention of national
authorities is key, in some situations the Office has stated that it would accept a
(not specified) “reasonable delay” in national proceedings, noting that “the

93
Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry
Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/52 (June 24, 2015).
94
It may be that the Prosecutor will also—or instead—conclude that Palestine is unwilling to
investigate and prosecute the crimes. In this regard, it is worth noting that the U.N. Commission of
Inquiry concluded that “investigations by Palestinian authorities are woefully inadequate, despite
allegations of violations of international humanitarian law by Palestinian actors, leaving Israeli victims
without an effective remedy. With respect to the local authorities in Gaza, no steps appear to have been
taken to ensure effective investigations into actions by Palestinian armed groups, seemingly owing to a
lack of political will.” Id.
95
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 50–54 (description of the
factors taken into account in this regard).
96
Id. at ¶ 52.
97
Id.
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fight against impunity appear[s] to remain a priority” of the relevant national
authorities.98
Given the time that has passed since the incidents in Gaza under
preliminary examination occurred, the question of whether there has been an
“unjustified delay” with respect to taking forward the investigation of these
crimes ought to arise in the Prosecutor’s assessment of willingness. Israeli
authorities point to the complexity of its investigations into crimes in Gaza as a
factor impacting their duration.99 This is “common practice,” and this aspect of
the complementarity assessment has presented significant challenges for
advancing accountability in situations involving states with significant
resources. Such states may be able to demonstrate that investigations into the
conduct of their armed forces are on-going, and claim that these take a long
time to complete due to their complexity, but they ultimately lead to no or very
limited accountability. In the U.K., for example, more than ten years after the
alleged crimes took place in Iraq, investigations are reportedly still ongoing,
but there is little to suggest the continuation will bring about any meaningful
form of accountability.100 This brings into question whether the ICC Prosecutor
would benefit from establishing deadlines for its conclusion of the
complementarity assessment at the preliminary examination stage.
As in other cases involving global and regional power, the main challenge
for bringing complementarity into action with respect to crimes allegedly
committed by Israel is, thus, not “ability” but “willingness.” As follows from
the analysis above, the framework for assessing complementarity during
preliminary examinations presents a range of obstacles for advancing
accountability, in particular in situations where there is prolonged domestic
investigatory activity. As will be discussed below, this brings into question the
merits of pursuing a strategy of positive complementarity in such situations.
IV. POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY—AN ASSET OR OBSTACLE TO
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMES IN PALESTINE?
A. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY, AND STATE
POWER
The principle of complementarity has often been pointed to as the
cornerstone of the Rome Statute.101 The principle is usually perceived as

98
2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, supra note 35 at ¶¶ 271–272 (remarks
in regard to Guinea).
99
STATE OF ISRAEL, THE ISRAELI SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE ¶ 457 (2015). The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs explains that “[o]ngoing examinations and investigations take time, due to, amongst
other things, the complexity of the issues, the challenges in investigating these types of incidents [] and
the need to coordinate testimony from third parties.”
100
See generally Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq, supra note 8.
101
See, e.g., Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court:
International Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 591, 593 (2003); Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role
of Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 120 (2001); Eve La Haye, The Jurisdiction of the
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something inherently “good,” because (1) it respects state sovereignty and
thereby, is thought to encourage state acceptance and ratification;102 (2) it
encourages the Court to use its limited resources wisely and focus on crimes
that would otherwise be left unaddressed;103 (3) it facilitates norm transmission
as the principle is thought to create a “strong incentive for national
implementation;”104 and (4) it promotes accountability because the principle
will “serve as a catalyst through which states parties are induced to comply
with their obligation to investigate and prosecute ICC crimes.”105
With respect to the latter argument, often referred to as a question of
“positive complementarity,”106 international criminal law scholarship tends to
assume that the potential for this to occur is greatest at the preliminary
examinations stage. The expectation typically is that once the ICC Prosecutor
opens a preliminary examination, the threat that the Office will proceed to a
full investigation will add sufficient pressure on the state in question for it to
commence its own proceedings, even if there may be important contradicting
national interests. The prevailing view seems to be that the anticipated reaction
from a state under preliminary examination is that it will “aggressively and
fairly pursue domestic prosecutions of international crimes so as not to trigger
the jurisdiction of the ICC over the case and invite the glare of the eyes of the
international community upon it.”107 The argument often is that preliminary
examinations present a powerful policy instrument of the ICC Prosecutor
because they “entail a high degree of “soft power” due to the large degree of
prosecutorial discretion, the indeterminacy of the decision-making process and
the strong expressive dimensions of ICC action.”108 ICC prosecutors have
similarly made far-reaching claims concerning the importance of positive
complementarity, sometimes implying that the ultimate goal of advancing
accountability for international crimes is best achieved by encouraging national

International Criminal Court: Controversies over the Preconditions for Exercising its Jurisdiction, 46
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (1999).
102
See, e.g., Frederic Mégret, Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical Exploration
Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity, in COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY
1–38 (Jann Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2006).
103
See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351–52 (Oxford Univ. Press
2003).
104
Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive
International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 86 (2003).
105
Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and
the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 205, 211 (2011).
106
The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations uses the term ‘positive complementarity’ to refer
to a situation where national judicial authorities and the ICC “function together” to create an
“interdependent, mutually reinforcing international system of justice.” OTP Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 100.
107
Bjork and Goebertus, supra note 105 at 208 (citing Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal
Court and Its Implications for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215,
223 (2003)) (summarizing the prevailing view). For examples of such expectations to positive
complementarity, see William W. Burke-White, Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in
the Rome System of Justice, 19(1) CRIM. L. FORUM 59, 62 (2007) (noting that “the overall goal of the
Rome Statute—ending impunity—may be best achieved through . . . encouragement of national
prosecutions”); see also Byproduct or Conscious Goal, supra note 22, at 181 (noting that preliminary
examinations can serve as an effective means of catalyzing political will toward prosecution in
situations under analysis as they create pressure for national judicial proceedings and the possible
incarceration of those responsible for crimes).
108
Stahn, supra note 22, at 416.
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authorities to prosecute such crimes in their own courts. ICC Prosecutor
Bensouda argues that the preliminary examination phase “is one of the most
remarkable efficiency tools we have at our disposal as it encourages national
prosecutions and prevents or puts an end to abuses,” allowing the Court “to
avoid opening investigations and prosecutions when national mechanisms are
functioning in accordance with our founding Statute.”109 The Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations states that one of the overall goals of preliminary
examinations involves the “ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine
national proceedings”110—a goal sometimes referred to in the Paper as
“[e]nding [i]mpunity through [p]ositive [c]omplementarity.”111 The Paper
emphasizes that “a significant part of the Office’s efforts at the preliminary
examination stage is directed towards encouraging States to carry out their
primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute international crimes.”112 In
practice, the ICC Prosecutor has sometimes been deferential to national
proceedings, seemingly avoiding to make a final conclusion on
complementarity as part of the admissibility assessment, in order to promote
positive complementarity.113
This begs the question whether the ICC Prosecutor will decide to proceed
with an investigation in the Palestine situation in the near future if it deems that
the legal requirements to complementarity are currently not satisfied, or if the
Office will “wait it out” in the hope that positive complementarity will
ultimately work.114

109
Fatou Bensouda, Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, 45 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 505, 507–09 (2012) (further noting that that positive complementarity implies “a
proactive policy of cooperation and consultation, aimed at promoting national proceedings and at
positioning itself as a sword of Damocles, ready to intervene in the event of unwillingness or inability
by national authorities”). Former Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo infamously stated that, “[t]he
effectiveness of the International Criminal Court should not be measured by the number of cases that
reach it. On the contrary, complementarity implies that the absence of trials before this Court, as a
consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.” Luis
Moreno-Ocampo (former Chief Prosecutor of the ICC), Statement, Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003).
110
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, at ¶ 93.
111
Id. at ¶ 100.
112
Id.
113
David Bosco, Assessing Complementarity in Palestine, LAWFARE (June 7, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/assessing-complementarity-palestine (noting that the Prosecutor has been
“very deferential to national proceedings [even ones fraught with problems] in places like
Colombia, Georgia, and Russia.” (brackets included in original)).
114
However, ICC prosecutors state this is not how decisions are made within the Office. In a recent
blog post, Emeric Rogier, Head of the Situational Analysis Section of the Office of the Prosecutor,
observes that positive complementarity is “not a policy choice.” Emeric Rogier, The Ethos of “Positive
Complementarity”, EJIL: TALK (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ethos-of-positivecomplementarity/#more-16701. At the same time, however, Rogier notes that positive complementarity
is only pursued in some situations (using the examples of Guinea and Colombia), but not in others
(using the example of U.K. in relation to Iraq), noting that “[i]n some cases, the OTP must first satisfy
itself, as in the Iraq/UK [sic] situation, that alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been
committed and/or meet the gravity threshold.” Id. However, if pursuing positive complementarity is not
articulated by prosecutors as a policy choice, but at the same it is a goal only pursued in some
situations, not others, one can question on what basis that is decided, since the Office must of course
always first satisfy itself that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court were committed.
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B. WHY POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IS UNLIKELY TO WORK IN THE PALESTINE
SITUATION
Despite optimism among ICC prosecutors and many scholars alike
concerning the capacity of preliminary examinations to galvanize domestic
accountability processes, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that ICC
preliminary examinations actually “trigger” genuine domestic accountability
processes.115 In fact, the limited empirical research that does exist on the topic
often challenges—and sometimes even contradicts—the assumption made by
prosecutors that preliminary examinations, through positive complementarity,
present the most significant tool for advancing accountability.116 Importantly,
none of the preliminary examinations that have been closed to date were
terminated on the basis of an admissibility assessment that domestic processes
rendered further ICC action unjustified.117
Challenges to making positive complementarity work are likely to be
particularly pronounced in situations involving states with significant resources
because they are better placed to manage or counter the ICC’s “soft power,” or
simply because they feel they have less to fear from the ICC.118 For example,
nothing suggests that ICC activity with respect to the U.S. activities in
Afghanistan has prompted U.S. authorities to take more seriously their
obligations to prosecute torture and other international crimes. Following a tenyear preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, in November
2017, the Prosecutor finally decided to request the Chamber’s authorization of
the opening of an investigation, noting that “no national investigations or
prosecutions have been conducted or are ongoing against those who appear
most responsible for the crimes allegedly committed by members of the US
armed forces” and the CIA.119 Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor sought and
obtained permission to open an investigation into the situation in Georgia on
the basis that no relevant domestic proceedings had been opened in Russia.120

115
See Paul Seils, Making Complementarity Work: Maximizing the Limited Role of the Prosecutor,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 989,
1012 (Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) (noting that whereas publicizing a situation
under preliminary examination may well have a catalytic influence, there is no proof of it having made
a difference.); see also Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why
International Criminal Court Investigations Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 111 AM. J.
INT’L L. 689 (2017).
116
See e.g., Dancy & Montal, supra note 115; see also Pressure Point, supra note 91.
117
Thomas Obel Hansen, The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: Ending Impunity through
‘Positive Complementarity’? (Transitional Justice Inst., Working Paper No. 17–01),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939139.
118
See Stahn, supra note 22 at 423–24 (noting that: “[e]xisting experiences show that ICC
engagement has promoted complementarity in countries with a strong rule of law culture. It has been
less effective in fragile environments. Domestic political elites may use ICC engagement as a means to
advancing their own political agendas.”). In the view of this author, there is no reason to assume that
political elites in more resourceful states will be less inclined to instrumentalize ICC processes, and
there appears to be no concrete examples of positive complementarity ‘working’ in such states.
119
Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Public Redacted Version of “Request for
Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15”, ICC-02/17-7-Red.20, ¶¶ 299, 312 (Nov. 20,
2017) (noting that the complementarity assessment was complicated by the fact that US authorities did
not engage her Office). At the time of writing, the Chamber was yet to rule on the request.
120
Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
(2015), ¶ 256 (Nov. 12, 2015) (The Prosecutor determined that, “despite a number of reported
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It is also questionable whether the ICC’s preliminary examination of the
situation in Iraq, involving allegations against British forces, has advanced
accountability at the domestic level. Despite assurances by British authorities
that they take accountability seriously and their submission that the ICC’s
preliminary examination should be terminated on grounds of
complementarity,121 there is little to suggest that any meaningful (criminal)
accountability for war crimes in Iraq will happen in the U.K. In 2017, the
government closed IHAT, the investigative body tasked with looking into Iraq
claims and fulfilling Britain’s obligations under the complementarity
regime.122 Further frustrating the process of seeking accountability for crimes
in Iraq, the British government “targeted the lawyers involved in the
accountability processes, and have made broader moves aimed at avoiding a
repeat of the legal processes that have emerged in this case, including a
proposal to derogate from human rights law so that it no longer applies to
situations of armed conflict.”123
This suggests that mainstream assumptions concerning the value of
preliminary examinations for positive complementarity may be overstated,
particularly in situations involving global and regional powers that perceive
that they have strong political interests in avoiding legal scrutiny of their
armed and security forces, and more broadly their legal and policy security
framework.
The particular circumstances surrounding the Palestine examination make
it unlikely that this situation should be different in terms of the ICC’s ability to
“push” the authorities into conducting genuine proceedings against the persons
allegedly responsible for the crimes under ICC examination. This is most
clearly the case concerning Israeli settlement activities. Since these are
authorized by the State and any investigation would almost automatically lead
to the senior leadership, it is virtually impossible to imagine that the ICC
process has the capacity to bring about a genuine domestic legal process,
regardless of the stigma associated with ICC intervention and regardless of
what action the ICC Prosecutor takes.124 In short, no soft, or hard, power will
make Israel pursue state-sanctioned settlement activities as a crime.125
verification efforts, no concrete and progressive steps have been taken in Russia to ascertain the
criminal responsibility of those involved in the alleged crimes related to the potential case(s) identified
in the Request.”).
121
The British government has made it clear that it believes the preliminary examination should be
closed, on three grounds: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction since the crimes were not committed on a large
scale; (2) due to the existence of judicial measures in the U.K. that address crimes in Iraq, the Rome
Statute’s complementarity regime renders the situation inadmissible; and (3) the information that the
preliminary examination is based on is not credible. See further Accountability for British War Crimes
in Iraq, supra note 8.
122
IHAT was replaced by a smaller team of service police investigators, criticized by human rights
organizations for lacking any semblance of an independent investigation. Id. at 445–46.
123
Id. at 430; see also Pressure Point, supra note 91, at 7 (noting that Human Rights Watch
research “indicates that the ICC’s involvement so far has not per se instigated or influenced national
proceedings in significant ways”).
124
See Stahn, supra note 22, at 416–418, for discussion on the stigma associated with ICC
intervention (observing, inter alia, that preliminary examinations “have a strong expressivist dimension
. . . They express harm and gravity of alleged violations and set important signals about the type of
atrocity situations that international criminal justice cares about”; further noting that one of most
important functions of preliminary examinations “lies in their social disapproval of a particular form of
behaviour,[sic] and their impact on accountability discourse” and that “[s]pecific findings in a
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This should lead the ICC Prosecutor to abandon any expectation of
positive complementarity, at least with regard to these aspects of the Palestine
examination.

CONCLUSION

ICC activities are increasingly focused on the conduct of global and
regional powers. This presents a significant change in international justice—
and the international system more generally. Yet for now only one
investigation (Georgia) has been opened which targets a global or regional
power (Russia) and no arrest warrants have been issued or trials commenced
against any citizen of a global or regional power to date.
Whereas there are multiple reasons for the difficulties associated with
advancing accountability for crimes by global and regional powers, this Article
has pointed to challenges posed by the ICC’s complementarity framework.
States with significant resources and sophisticated legal systems have unique
opportunities to utilize these to halt quick progression of ICC activity. Notably,
as appears to be the case with respect to Israeli inquiries into crimes during the
2014 Gaza conflict, such states may initiate investigatory activity, but without
intending to bring about meaningful accountability for those most responsible
for the crimes. Even when they do not, as is the case with Israeli settlements,
the policy objective of positive complementarity, endorsed by ICC prosecutors
and many commentators alike, can in the worst case serve to delay
accountability.
Expectations to positive complementarity ought to be low in situations
where the legal assessment of complementarity points to inactivity following a
sustained period of time, or when identified accountability processes only
pursue a limited number of direct physical perpetrators, or for other reasons
suggest lack of political will to advance accountability domestically. In
situations where it is asserted that a global or regional power has proven over a
sustained period of time that it is unwilling to investigate and prosecute those
most responsible for crimes under ICC examination—as is the case with
Israel’s settlement activities and crimes committed in the 2014 Gaza conflict—
there is little merit in pursuing positive complementarity in the face of state
opposition to accountability. If anything, states with significant resources and
sophisticated legal systems ought to be held to more rigorous standards than
states that for reasons of limited capacity may experience challenges giving
effect to accountability norms. So far, most ICC investigations have focused on
the latter category.
preliminary examination or the mere absence of closure may entail certain stigmas or associations that
states, governments or affected entities are keen to avoid.”).
125
See Pressure Point, supra note 91, at 8, for a discussion on the general challenges to positive
complementarity in situations where there is no, or only very limited, political will domestically for
accountability (noting “[t]he extent of opposition to accountability by powerful interests in the country
will constrain the OTP’s influence. The lack of full political support for accountability—regardless of
stated intention by governments—was a constant across” the case studies examined by Human Rights
Watch).
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Despite the challenges pointed to in this Article, the ICC’s intervention in
Palestine does present an opportunity to advance accountability norms for
violations of international law in the country, including Israel’s settlement
activities and violations reported to be committed by both parties to the 2014
Gaza conflict. Even if accountability for crimes in Palestine may not happen in
the near future, the ICC’s intervention is important because it influences the
behavior of actors in the conflict and disseminates particular narratives of the
violations, the actors responsible, and the conflict more broadly. In a sense, the
Prosecutor’s decision to focus on certain crimes—including Israeli settlement
activities—“elevates” public perceptions of the seriousness of the behavior in
question and makes it subject to additional international scrutiny and
potentially condemnation. In particular, the symbolic and practical importance
of potentially adjudicating settlement as a war crime under the Rome Statute
should not be underestimated. Even if the Palestine examination may not
progress quickly, as long as it remains open it will continue to have significant
legitimacy costs for Israel.

30

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 9:2

ANNEX - OVERVIEW OF ICC ACTIVITY RELATING TO GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
POWERS (AS OF FEBRUARY 2019)

→ Progress of ICC activity
Russia (Ukraine)

Israel (Palestine)

UK (Iraq)

US (Afghanistan)

Russia (Georgia)

Status of PE/
inv.

PE announced
opened in 2014 / PE
currently in phase
two

PE announced reopened in 2015 after
initial closure in
2012 / PE currently
in phase three

PE announced reopened in 2014 after
initial closure in
2006 / PE currently
in phase three

PE announced
opened in 2007 /
OTP req. to open
inv. submitted in
Nov 2017 (yet to be
decided)

PE announced
opened in 2008 /
inv. opened in Oct
2015 (no trials or
arrest warrants to
date)

Legal basis
for PE/ inv.

Art 12(3) decl. by
Ukraine (potential
inv. to rely on
proprio motu
powers)

Art 12(3) decl. by
Palestine +
Palestine referral
(Palestine state
party)

Potential inv. to rely
on proprio motu
(U.K. state party)

Potential inv. to rely
on proprio motu
(Afghanistan state
party)

Proprio motu
(Georgia state
party)

Actors under
ICC scrutiny

1) “Self-defense
militia”/ “antigovernment armed
groups”; 2) Russian
armed forces; 3)
Russian authorities;
4) de facto Crimean
authorities; 5) proUkrainian forces

1) Israeli
authorities; 2)
Israeli armed forces;
3) Palestinian armed
groups

1) U.K. armed
forces

1) Taliban; 2)
Afghan security
forces, 3) U.S.
armed forces and
CIA

Armed forces of:
1) Georgia, 2)
South Ossetia, and
3) Russia

Complement
arity
assessment

No PE
complementarity
assessment yet /
unclear if
complementarity
could pose obstacle
to opening of inv.

PE complementarity
assessment
commenced/
complementarity
could pose obstacle
to opening of inv.

PE complementarity
assessment
completed/
complementarity
unlikely to pose
obstacle to opening
of inv.

PE
complementarity
assessment
completed/
complementarity
could pose
obstacle re Russia
but unlikely re
Georgia

Government
response (by
main power)

Aggressive / not
engaging:
•No engagement
with Court
•Active steps to
undermine
accountability:
withdrew signature
to Rome Statute in
2016
•Rejects legitimacy
of ICC process on
basis that Court is
political

PE complementarity
assessment
commenced/
complementarity
could pose obstacle
to opening of inv. re
Israeli crimes in
Gaza; unlikely re
settlements and
Palestinian armed
groups
Shifting (aggressive
to conciliatory)/
engaging:
•Some engagement
with Court
•Active steps to
undermine
accountability: a)
efforts to prevent
Palestine from
joining ICC; b)
states will
“dismantle” ICC
•Rejects legitimacy
of ICC process on
basis that Court is
political / “antiIsraeli”

Measured /
engaging:
•Extensive
engagement with
Court
•Active steps to
undermine
accountability: 1)
targeting of
involved lawyers; 2)
broader moves to
avoid repetition of
legal process
•Rejects legitimacy
of ICC process on
basis that: a)
allegations not
credible; b) ICC
lacks jurisdiction);
c) complementarity

Aggressive / not
engaging:
•No (official)
engagement with
Court
• Strongly worded
statements
concerning possible
reprisals against
Court officials etc
•Rejects legitimacy
of ICC process on
basis that ICC does
not have jurisdiction
over US citizens

[see Russia
response under
“Ukraine
examination”]
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POST-SCRIPT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES SEEKING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES IN PALESTINE UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S
COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME

This Article was drafted and edited for publication before the Pre-Trial
Chamber II rendered its long-awaited decision in April 2019 on the
Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation into the situation in
Afghanistan, declining the Prosecutor’s request.126 Whereas the Chamber
found that the statutory requirements relating to subject-matter jurisdiction and
admissibility—and thus complementarity—were met for the purposes of this
stage of the proceedings,127 it held that the opening of an investigation would
not be in “the interests of justice” under Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome
Statute.128 The Chamber cited to the significant time elapsed between the
alleged crimes and the investigation request, constraints on the Prosecutor’s
resources, and—conspicuously—the political circumstances surrounding the
Afghanistan situation, including expected non-cooperation by both state and
non-state parties, such as the United States (U.S.), which the Chamber
concluded made the “prospects for a successful investigation and prosecution
extremely limited.”129 Commentators have—and rightly so, the Author
believes—noted that the decision rewards non-cooperation and open hostility
towards the ICC,130 and that ICC judges have never before appeared “so
clearly political than with their decision not to investigate
[]Afghanistan.”131 Where some commentators suggest the decision may likely
be ultra vires,132 others speculate that the Prosecutor may not be able to appeal

126
Int’l Criminal Court, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (Apr. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Decision ICC-02/17].
127
With regard to complementarity, the Chamber observed that “the information about
investigation efforts at the domestic level in the US made available by the Prosecution, the Chamber
notes that the information does not show that criminal investigations or prosecutions have been
conducted on the incidents referred to and relied upon by the Prosecution, also bearing in mind that
national proceedings designed to result in non-judicial and administrative measures rather than criminal
prosecutions do not result in inadmissibility under article 17.” Id. at ¶ 79.
128
Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 53(1)(c).
129
Decision ICC-02/17, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 91–96.
130
Dov Jacobs, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Rejects OTP Request to Open an Investigation in
Afghanistan: Some Preliminary Thoughts on an Ultra Vires Decision, SPREADING JAM (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://dovjacobs.com/2019/04/12/icc-pre-trial-chamber-rejects-otp-request-to-open-an-investigationin-afghanistan-some-preliminary-thoughts-on-an-ultra-vires-decision/; Mark Kersten, Why the ICC
Should Have Opened an Investigation into Afghanistan. And How It Could ‘Win’ a Confrontation with
Washington, JUST. CONFLICT (Apr. 12, 2019), https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/04/12/why-the-iccshould-have-opened-an-investigation-into-afghanistan-and-how-it-could-win-a-confrontation-withwashington/; Kevin J. Heller, One Word for the PTC on the Interests of Justice: Taliban, OPINIO JURIS
(Apr. 13, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/13/one-word-for-the-ptc-on-the-interests-of-justicetaliban/.
131
Mark Kersten (@MarkKersten), TWITTER (Apr. 13, 2019, 11:39 A.M.),
https://twitter.com/MarkKersten/status/1117135116789145600.
132
Dov Jacobs, Some Extra Thoughts on Why the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Acted Ultra Vires in
Using the “Interests of Justice” to Not Open an Investigation in Afghanistan, SPREADING JAM (Apr. 12,
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it due to the framing of the Rome Statute.133 In all events, the decision clearly
presents a massive set-back for the prospects of holding major military powers
accountable for international crimes and—quite openly—demonstrates the
futility of the ICC system in the face of U.S. hostility. As expected, the Trump
administration praised the Chamber’s decision, with President Trump stating it
was “a major international victory, not only for these patriots, but for the rule
of law.”134 At the same time, the President seemingly sent another warning to
the ICC, making it clear that “[a]ny attempt to target American, Israeli or allied
personnel for prosecution will be met with a swift and vigorous response.”135
Now, the latter, of course, brings into question what implications these
developments may have for the Palestine examination. Will we once again see
international justice bow to political pressure, or may the lack of involvement
of the Chambers in a potential decision to open a full investigation give more
room for hope? Only time will tell. What is clear for now is that Israeli leaders
are openly celebrating the decision, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
noting:
[W]hat we have here is a correction of injustice, and it is an
act that has far-reaching influence with regard to the conduct
of the international system in relation to the State of Israel . . .
I congratulate the United States, President Trump, and the
Trump administration for their steadfast position on the side
of the citizens of Israel and the soldiers of the IDF. As in
previous times, it is proven that Israel has no better friend
than the United States, and we very much appreciate this
support in other areas as well.136

2019), https://dovjacobs.com/2019/04/12/some-extra-thoughts-on-why-the-icc-pre-trial-chamber-actedultra-vires-in-using-the-interests-of-justice-to-not-open-an-investigation-in-afghanistan/.
133
Kevin J. Heller, Can the PTC’s Afghanistan Decision Be Appealed?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 12,
2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/12/can-the-ptcs-afghanistan-decision-be-appealed/.
134
Carol Morello, Trump Administration Applauds International Court’s Decision to Abandon Afghan
War Crimes Probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/trump-administration-applauds-international-courts-decision-to-abandon-afghan-war-crimesprobe/2019/04/12/610fd2b6-5d4a-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html?utm_term=.2258cc64c49f
(citation omitted).
135
Id.
136
Netanyahu Congratulates Trump on ICC Decision Not to Investigate U.S. Forces, HAARETZ
(Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-netanyahu-congratulates-trump-on-iccdecision-not-to-investigate-u-s-forces-1.7119243.

